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RECENT DECISIONS

PARTIES - REPRESENTATIVE SuITS AS REs JumcATA- REJECTION oF
DOCTRINE OF CLASS SUITS IN SUCCESSIVE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE MUTUAL
COVENANTS IN LAND - Some 500 frontage owners in a certain described residential district entered into mutual covenants which stipulated against the sale
to, or occupation of, such land by negroes. In an action to enjoin a breach of
one of these covenants the defense was asserted that a condition precedent requiring ninety-five per cent of the frontage owners to sign the agreement had
not been performed. On a trial of the merits it was found that only about fiftyfour per cent of the frontage owners had actually signed. However, in a prior
action,1 an owner, on behalf of herself and other like property owners, had
sought successfully to enjoin a similar breach regarding other land within the
described area. The parties there had stipulated that the conditions of the
agreement were fully performed, the controversy having been whether the
agreement should be unenforceable due to changed conditions. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed the ruling of the circuit court that the issue of performance of the condition precedent was res judicata due to this previous class
suit.2 Held, because the defendants in the prior action were not designated as
representing a class and because the interests of the plaintiff there were so conflicting with the interests of the defendant in this action, the former adjudication could not bind defendant. Hansberry v. Lee, (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. u5.
The class suit 3 is an exception to the general rule in equity that all persons
materially interested in the subject matter of the suit are to be made parties
to it in order that complete justice may be done.4 Rather than require all the
parties to be brought into court the effect and purpose of the class suit is to
adjudicate the interests of absent parties through the representative in court.15
As this is an apparent departure from the constitutional guaranty that every
party is entitled to his day in court and suggests violation of the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the limitations of these suits
are construed strictly.6 There are two essential requisites of a representative suit
which must be met, whether that suit be brought under the regular equity prac-

Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939), noted in 7 UNiv.
CHI. L. REv. 563 (1940). The principal case has been noted in 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv.
525 (1941); 21 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 132 (1941).
3 For a description and explanation of the various "class" or "representative" suits,
see McLaughlin, "The Mystery of the Representative Suit," 26 GEo. L. J. 878 (1938).
4 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, 10th ed., §§ 72, 94, 97 (1892).
15 That a "class" or "representative" suit is res judicata and binding on the represented party as to all issues which were, or which might have been, litigated in that
suit, see 38 M1cH. L. REv. 419 (1940); 2 KAN. ST. B. A. J. 297 (1934).
6 One not designated a party or made such by service of process is not bound by
a judgment in personam. Pennoyer v. Ne.ff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). And enforcement of
a judgment against such a person would be denial of due process. Postal Telegraph
Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 38 S. Ct. 566 (1918); Old Wayne Mut. Life
Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907). Cf. dissenting opinion of
Justice Shaw in Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369 at 379, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939).
i
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tice or under the modern codes: 7 (I) the parties must be so numerous that it
would be impracticable to bring them all into open court; and, (2) the parties
must stand in the same situation, having one common or general interest which
can be enforced or protected for the common benefit of all, and without prejudice
to any. The "common interest" for purposes of a representative suit is a broader
concept than privity or a joint interest in the subject matter and may consist
of merely a question of fact or law on which the individual rights of all the
parties depend. The test is I really whether the controversy can be settled expeditiously and yet with perfect fairness to all parties concerned by allowing
one party to represent the rest. 8 It is this test which is the more important limitation on class suits and is stressed by the principal case. The general interest of
the represented parties in the outcome of the suit must be the same as that of
the representative. There must be no special claims or liabilities,9 the interest
must be common to all,1° and the position of the representative must carry
through the adjudication.11 In the last analysis the purpose of this requirement
is to protect the interest of the absent represented party.12 If this can be done,
then the "rule of fairness" of due process should be satisfied and the courts can
properly make one law suit where there were several before. The court in the
principal. case properly recognized that the enforcement of mutual restrictive
covenants in one action against all possible breaches was not a proper application
of the class suit doctrine. Although the parties plaintiff might fall within a
class,18 the parties defendant would not. The obligations or liabilities created by
7 As to class suits under the codes, see Blume, "The 'Common Questions' Principle
in the Code Provisions for Representative Suits," 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1932);
Wheaton, "Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants," 19 CoRN. L. Q. 399
(1934); Moore and Cohn, "Federal Class Actions," 32 ILL. L. REv. 307 (1937);
Moore and Cohn, "Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment," 32
ILL. L. REV. 555 (1937); Masse, "Representation Orders," 85 L. J. 324 (1938).
8 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, 10th ed., § 126 ( 1892).
9 Chafee, "Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties," 45 HARV. L. REv. 1297 at
1308 (1932) :_ "On the other hand, if the unjoined persons have special claims or
liabilities, their rights are personal and can not be concluded in their absence. This
cardinal principle of class suits has frequently been expressed as requiring that the
subject matter of suit must be in the nature of a 'general right.' "
10 In Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 591 (1854), the Court refused to
consider as members of a class a number of persons who were upon various parts of
a tract of land through the alleged wrongful act of a single third party.
11 Where a taxpayer sold his lot before actually going to trial, though after
commencement of the action, he could no longer represent others in the district in
protesting a sewer assessment. Alber v. City of Kansas City, 138 Kan. 184, 25 P. (2d)
364 (1933).
12 " • • • no case has come to my attention where the court has failed to make
absolutely certain, in advance, that the parties to represent a class must be selected
with such care and have such personal interest in the litigation as to guarantee that
rights of all will be fully protected." Dissenting opinion of Justice Shaw in Lee v.
Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369 at 379, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939).
18 The purpose of putting parties plaintiff in a class seems to be to prevent double
vexation for defendant. The cases are found collected in annotations in 21 A. L. R.
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a restrictive agreement are not joint, 'but run severally from each individuai
promisor,14 while the corresponding rights are held jointly by all frontage owners
against the promisor. Any defenses an individual owner might have are personal and his interests could not possibly be protected by a different owner in
another suit.15 Thus it is seen that the decision in the present case is no departure
from the established principles of res judicata and the requirement that a party
must be in court to be bound by the judgment.

Gerald M. Lively

1281 (1922); 33 A. L. R. 676 (1924); 60 A. L. R. 1223 (1929); 89 A. L. R.
812 (1934).
u Principal case, 61 S. Ct. at u9.
15 Such defenses might be fraud in obtaining the signature, laches in enforcement, and abrogation of the covenant by mortgage foreclosure. 7 UNiv. CHr. L. REv.
563 (1940).

